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Abstract
How ‘evidence’ is conceptualised, generated and deployed in meso-level policy 
implementation on the ground is critical to health delivery. Using the case of a 
large-scale health service reconfiguration in northwest England, this study began as 
a narrative investigation into how different data types and sources are prioritised as 
NHS administrative structures change over time. During the research, one unpopular 
reconfiguration decision, the downgrading of a hospital, was challenged using judi-
cial review. Suddenly, a key decision was being based not upon ‘facts and data’ type 
evidence but upon evidence of adherence to administrative procedure. This trans-
ferred focus away from the ever-shifting categories and hierarchies of data ‘types’ 
towards an emphasis on process. By comparing two deliberative contexts—commit-
tee and judicial review—this article proposes that evidence can be understood as 
simultaneously entity and process. As health service reconfigurations continue in 
response to austerity, integration agendas, evolving organisational landscapes, and 
demographic and political change, it is increasingly important to recognise the dif-
ferent meanings and uses of evidence.
Keywords Decision making · Deliberation · Evidence · Health service 
reconfiguration · Judicial review
Introduction
Evidence, a master-term, has quite different meanings across contexts. This article 
will establish the crucial importance of ‘evidence’ terminology. It rehearses the key 
argument, that evidence takes divergent forms, using a case study of health service 
reconfiguration in Greater Manchester, UK, culminating in a judicial review (JR). 
The background and political context of the case study is described, followed by a 
detailed analysis. The article concludes with a warning, that in the context of EBP, 
we must exercise caution in our use of evidence terminology, which carries various 
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political-contextual baggage. A more sophisticated understanding can inform poli-
cymakers, especially around long-term planning, and researchers examining how 
different forms of evidence are assembled to yield different policy outcomes.
The primacy of evidence in underpinning and justifying public policy deci-
sions is broadly accepted as self-explanatory (Marston and Watts 2003, p. 144). 
Research on Evidence-Based Policy (EBP) has tended to emphasize the actual 
techniques used, giving rise to elaborate systematised processes of evidence gen-
eration and organisation, designed to convey fidelity to ‘scientific practice’. EBP 
has its origins in the logic of evidence-based medicine which, ‘…with its evidence 
hierarchies and emphasis on RCTs, meta-analyses and systematic reviews, sets 
the model for evidence-based policy almost everywhere’ (Cowen and Cartwright 
2019, p. 1). While RCTs are still considered a ‘gold standard’ of evidence (ibid.: 
7) in many contexts, their value is widely contested, especially in public policy 
(Cartwright and Hardie 2012). In fact, Byrne and Callaghan (2013) argue that the 
method is wholly useless for evaluating complex interventions in complex sys-
tems. In public health policy, where social determinants, values and context play 
significant roles, a broader array of evidence types is used. Here, especially at the 
intersections of health and social care, debates around how to manage such com-
plex dynamic systems draw on a range of heterogeneous evidence types includ-
ing ‘expert knowledge; published research; existing statistics; stakeholder con-
sultations; previous policy evaluations; outcomes from consultations; costings of 
policy options; outputs from economic and statistical modelling’ (Cabinet Office 
1999, p. 33). The tendency to categorise, assign values and place evidence ‘types’ 
into hierarchies (Weiss 2001; Brighton et  al. 2003; Petticrew and Roberts 2003; 
Parkhurst and Abeysinghe 2016), attributes evidence with entity status—as data 
or material that functions to support a theory or argument, in this case, for making 
changes to the way health resources are allocated. But evidence hierarchies and 
health organisations are complex dynamic systems, adapting in relation to politi-
cal or other contextual factors.
EBP has been criticised for being: over-reliant on methods such as RCTs (Cart-
wright and Hardie 2012); subject to replication problems (Begley and Ioannidis 
2015; Saltelli and Funtowicz 2017; Camerer et al. 2018); overly technocratic and 
susceptible to political manipulation (Lewis 2003); undermined by the theory- and 
value-laden nature of facts (Reiss 2017); and unappreciative of the complexity of 
policy subjects and of policymaking itself (Cairney 2016). Recent approaches, such 
as EBM + in medical philosophy (Clarke et al. 2013, 2014) and complexity theo-
ries in social sciences (Castellani and Hafferty 2009; Byrne and Callaghan 2013; 
Holmes et al. 2016) enable more nuanced thinking about the meanings and uses of 
evidence in EBP. Here, context has become increasingly important in mainstream 
policymaking; for example, the Dutch Council for Health and Society operates a 
policy of ‘No evidence without context’, which advocates moving from evidence-
based to context-based practices (2017). These developments have led to a soften-
ing in some policymaking circles from ‘evidence-based’ to ‘evidence-informed’, 
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reopening both ontological and epistemological debates.1 Nevertheless, the debate 
and disagreement around EBP has created a context of perpetual critique; ‘the dirty 
secret [of EBP] is that we don’t know whether we’re doing the right thing’ (Guay 
2018).
This article explores a departure from the idea of ‘entity’ evidence—a set of cat-
egorizable context-entangled informational ‘objects’—and proposes that evidence 
also comprises ‘processes’. This blended modality, incorporating both object and 
dynamic, offers a useful way to analyse how evidence operates in complex public 
administrative processes. In Greater Manchester, significant reconfiguration deci-
sions were based on a range of evidence types, determined by and exposed to differ-
ent organisational processes, audiences and forms of deliberation. The Greater Man-
chester context is described, including health service reconfigurations over the last 
decade and the present situation, known as ‘Devo Health’, which led among other 
things to the downgrading of a hospital, an event that became the subject of a legal 
challenge that treated evidence in a different way. This article explores aspects relat-
ing to evidence use in such decisions to support the thesis that evidence can be con-
ceptualised equally well as an object, a process or both.
The Greater Manchester case
Healthcare in the UK is mainly provided by the National Health Service (NHS). As 
a large and well-loved public institution, how the NHS performs and is organised is 
a matter of great public interest. This section describes two significant political fac-
tors affecting the NHS: (a) the UK government’s austerity programme and (b) the 
devolution of local health decisions in Greater Manchester.
Following the 2007/2008 global financial crash, the UK’s Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government initiated a programme of financial austerity in 2010. 
This involved reductions in public spending and selective tax increases.2 Although 
the government claimed that the NHS had been ‘ring fenced’ from such cuts, the 
austerity programme impacted all areas of public spending. For example, personal 
financial problems caused by welfare cuts led to increased mental health issues, 
placing further pressures on the NHS (Knapp 2012). Other complex relationships 
between health and social issues emerged, showing that the NHS remained vulner-
able to the effects of austerity (Stuckler et  al. 2017). The rate of growth for NHS 
funding almost flattened during austerity. “Budgets rose by 1.4 per cent each year 
on average (adjusting for inflation) between 2009/2010 and 2018/2019, compared 
to the 3.7% average rises since the NHS was established” (King’s Fund 2020). In 
Greater Manchester, decisions became increasingly based on financial rather than 
1 Ontological: is evidence a thing or a process, or both? RCTs and other scientistic approaches assume a 
mechanistic ontology to reveal the true nature of things. Epistemological: evidence is how we justify the 
belief in an action, so what is our relationship to it? ‘Justification’ is itself highly value-laden and the use 
of evidence is instrumental in our own value systems. In the political realm, ideas like ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ 
have only partial currency.
2 Selective tax increases: for example, the rate of value-added tax, a regressive tax, was increased, while 
the marginal tax rate on the highest incomes was reduced.
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health-related factors, revealing austerity as a significant driver underpinning the 
reconfiguration decisions described here.
The widening funding gap, exacerbated by the UK’s growing and ageing popula-
tion, resulted in the NHS having to make ‘efficiency savings’ of potentially up to 
£50bn by 2021/2022 (Roberts et al. 2012, p. 6). Overall, NHS organisational deci-
sions have shifted in character from being clinically-based to economics-based 
(Horton 2017).
While this article focuses on Greater Manchester’s devolved health and social 
care context, the UK political structure remains highly centralized. Booth (2019) 
observes, “Not only is Britain a highly centralised state, it is constitutionally inco-
herent. In many cases, the government has devolved spending powers to Wales, 
Scotland and areas such as Manchester. However, it has not properly devolved tax-
raising powers”. Consequently, devolved authorities such as Greater Manchester 
remain more accountable to Westminster than to their local populace. The Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) is therefore heavily reliant on central 
government funding allocations and so to wider (as well as local) political/financial 
factors.3
In 2011, Greater Manchester became a devolved ‘city-region’, governed by a 
combined authority. By 2015, the GMCA had been given increased control over its 
£6bn health and social care budget (then dubbed ‘Healthopolis’ but now known as 
‘Devo Health’) and became responsible for the overall strategic direction of health 
and social care in Greater Manchester. This was seen as an opportunity to restruc-
ture services more in line with local needs and to pursue the NHS integration agenda 
as part of the broader narrative of health service reform. The present study began by 
examining the changing nature of evidence types used in various reconfigurations 
since 2005. During the research, one controversial decision, the downgrading of a 
hospital, was challenged using judicial review. This raised a different set of ques-
tions about the nature of evidence and its use, and became the new focus of the 
study.
Evidence used in health reconfigurations in Greater Manchester since 2005
It is possible to describe a timeline of how different evidence types have been priori-
tised according to NHS organisational changes and wider political or economic driv-
ers. The mid-2000s ‘Healthy Futures’ and ‘Making it Better’ reconfigurations across 
Greater Manchester were driven by four main arguments: a clinical case for the mer-
its of concentrating services; a policy case—compliance with the European Work-
ing Time Directive; epidemiological evidence based on population projections; and 
a public consultation. These were approved by a joint committee of Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs, NHS administrative bodies responsible for commissioning services). 
However, the evidence was strongly criticised and challenged by Ruane (2007), 
who disputed the quality/volume evidence that underpinned the ‘concentration of 
3 A discrepancy recently illustrated (October 2020) by the government imposing Covid-19 lockdown 
restrictions on Manchester while limiting its financial support to the city.
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services’ argument; indicated key factors missing from the epidemiological evi-
dence; and suggested that the way this was presented to the public was biased. 
Ruane’s argument was ignored by the Independent Reconfiguration Panel for NHS 
Service Change and the reconfigurations were implemented. This happened under a 
Labour government at a time of relative prosperity for public services, so while eco-
nomic factors informed decision-making, these were less apparent in any rationale.
Supplanting PCTs, Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) were established 
following the Health and Social Care Act (2012), enabling clinicians with better 
knowledge of local needs to take meso-level decisions around resource allocation 
and service configurations. GP Clinical Directors were required to run their prac-
tices as businesses, so began to take more corporate approaches, giving increased 
prominence to accounting evidence. A more business-focused NHS emerged into 
an austerity context; configuration decisions increasingly hinged on ‘doing more 
with less’. This is reflected in the NHS’ gradual move away from employing CIPFA 
(Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy) accountants, who pursue 
more traditional ‘book balancing’ approaches, towards CIMA (Chartered Institute 
of Management Accountants) accountants, who pursue more strategic and profit-
oriented methods. There is also a trust issue; medics are perceived as ‘heroic’ (in 
comparison to accountants or politicians), so the idea of CCGs shaping local health 
economies carries a great deal of intuitive value in convincing members of the pub-
lic in consultation. However, clinician-originated evidence may also be aimed at 
an internal audience, who want to be reassured they are making the right decisions 
(Byrne 2011, p. 109).
These structural and perceptual changes corresponded with the launch of Health-
ier Together, which was more explicitly finance-oriented. The overarching Devo 
Health strategy was required to save £2bn over a five-year period so the austerity 
mantra of ‘do more with less’ therefore provided a strong justification for service 
integration. Financial reasoning continues to determine NHS organisational struc-
ture. For example, ‘Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships’ (from which 
Greater Manchester is currently exempt), introduced in 2017, have been denounced 
as being explicitly financially motivated.
It is clear (to me at least) that the NHS is moving away from the legal frame-
work embedded in the 2012 Health and Social Care Act which if my memory 
doesn’t fail me was based on competition between providers, guided by local 
commissioning led by local GP’s, and away from “political” decision making 
to one driven by market forces, subject to economic and quality regulation… 
Commissioning has moved (or is moving…) from a local base to one framed 
by the Sustainability and Transformation Partnership footprint (Steer 2019).
Healthier Together, Devo Health and organisational discrepancy (2012‑present)
‘Healthier Together’, launched February 2012, sought to rationalise healthcare pro-
vision across Greater Manchester by moving treatment out of hospitals and into 
community settings, enabling the former to provide better services and the lat-
ter to benefit from ‘joined up care’ between local councils and the NHS (Healthier 
 A. N. Fletcher 
Together 2015). This explicitly clinically-led programme is run by a ‘Committees 
in Common’ (CiC) of GP representatives from each of Greater Manchester’s 10 
CCGs, amplifying the clinical voice and leveraging the commissioning power to 
implement new strategies alongside more centralised political and financial agendas 
(Heritage 2014). However, the programme became subsumed and heavily influenced 
by Greater Manchester’s wider devolution project and its inherently complex local 
political, spatial and economic factors (Checkland et al. 2015).
While not part of Healthier Together’s original remit, integrating health and 
social care is part of NHS England’s Five Year Forward View (2014), a planning 
document that set out to establish new models of care across seven domains (com-
munity, primary, emergency etc.), with an emphasis on serving local needs, as well 
as on collaboration and integration across a range of services including social care. 
This is considered a valuable strategy in terms of efficient use of resources, espe-
cially during a period of austerity. ‘Policy-makers and payers [sic] in both the public 
and private sectors place great hope in [integrated care’s] ability to save money…’ 
(Kodner and Spreeuwenberg 2002, p. 2). Despite Healthier Together claiming that 
its processes did not focus on wider financial sustainability (2015, p. 36), some 
stakeholders raised concerns that the proposed changes ‘were being driven primar-
ily by financial considerations as opposed to a commitment to improve outcomes’ 
(ibid.: 44). While the aim of ‘joined up care’ may be underpinned by efficiency driv-
ers, it is also clinically rational to co-locate or improve links between related ser-
vices—and rationality was an important factor in the judicial review.
Devo Health refers to a number of significant changes that took place in the 
Greater Manchester health economy between 2012 and 2019. Both Healthier 
Together and Devo Health are overseen by the Health and Social Care Strategic 
Partnership Board (HSCSPB), whose stated remit is to progress the integration 
agenda by ‘finding what works on a local level, and… responding to what peo-
ple need across all ten boroughs’ (2018). Having broad representation from across 
health, social care and emergency services enables a diverse array of evidence types 
to inform the board’s overall strategic direction, although the success of this enter-
prise requires a great deal of cooperation and collaboration. This leads to a prob-
lem; CCGs are purchasers, so Healthier Together, which holds statutory authority 
for local service delivery, operates in a competitive manner. But Devo Health, which 
has responsibility for the overall strategic direction of health and social care in GM, 
requires a more collective approach among the diverse representation of its govern-
ing HSCSPB.
In this administrative tangle, different evidence types have different values. 
Healthier Together strongly emphasised being clinically-led and responsive to a 
public consultation. Its decision-making was informed by both clinical and consulta-
tion evidence.4 However, it was bound by the strategic decisions of the HSCSPB, 
which drew on evidence from a wider pool of organisations and had less clear pub-
lic representation. It remains unclear which of the two organisations—the CCG-led 
4 Such consultations often involve presenting a clinical argument to the public to inform its opinion so it 
is debatable how much these two evidence sources might offer usefully different perspectives.
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Healthier Together, or the more diverse but also more politically and financially-
informed HSCSPB—had the ultimate decision-making power over ‘on the ground’ 
reconfiguration. Checkland et  al. (2015) express this as: the organisational com-
plexity that arises when a secondary healthcare system, based on competition in 
an internal market, has a strategic layer added to it that requires cooperation and 
coordination.
The Healthy Futures and Making it Better reconfigurations; the introduction of 
CCGs; Healthier Together and Devo Health all used different forms of entity evi-
dence, determined by the prevailing NHS organisational structure at the time, to jus-
tify service reconfiguration decisions. While this is unsurprising, evidence can also 
be used in a different way…
Judicial review (2015–2016)
It was determined in March 2015 ‘that there must be a “specialist” hospital in the 
southern sector’ (Healthier Together 2015, p. 169). Healthier Together’s ‘Decision 
Making Management Report’ (DMMR, which presented data and information to 
support the Healthier Together CiC in making its configuration decisions) identi-
fied a large postcode-defined catchment area, ‘South of GM’ (2015, pp. 130–131), 
in which Wythenshawe and Stepping Hill, being similarly sized general hospitals, 
were the only viable options for providing specialist care.5 Wythenshawe is a major 
acute teaching hospital (at the time, part of University Hospital of South Manches-
ter NHS Foundation Trust, which served a population of approximately 570,000), 
with around 910 inpatient beds and providing district General Hospital services, as 
well as specialist tertiary and a range of medical and surgical acute services (Care 
Quality Commission 2016b). Stepping Hill is one of three hospitals run by Stock-
port NHS Foundation Trust, which serves a population of around 350,000. It is the 
Trust’s main acute site, providing a full range of hospital services including emer-
gency care, critical care, and a comprehensive range of elective and non-elective 
general medicine and surgery. The hospital had 833 inpatient beds in 2016 (Care 
Quality Commission 2016a).6 The local area of Stockport has slightly less poverty 
and slightly better health than Wythenshawe (GMCA 2021).
In 2015, Healthier Together announced that Stepping Hill Hospital had been con-
ferred specialist status in emergency abdominal surgery, resulting in that special-
ism being removed from—and effectively downgrading—Wythenshawe Hospital 
(despite Healthier Together initially claiming that no services would be removed or 
hospitals downgraded).
Clinicians from Wythenshawe Hospital mounted a legal challenge against the 
decision through judicial review (JR), a process of the administrative court that 
5 Tameside General Hospital and Macclesfield General Hospital (to the east and south of GM respec-
tively) were also in scope during the early planning stages but fell outside of the DMMR catchment area.
6 This comparison uses 2016 data, from closer to the time of the original specialist status decision in 
2015. Wythenshawe Hospital has been part of Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust since 1 
October 2017, which serves a larger population of 750,000.
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enables an individual or group to challenge decisions made by a public body. JR 
examines whether the process by which the original decision was made (a) followed 
the law and (b) was ‘rational’ (defined, according to Lord Diplock (1985), by its 
opposite, irrationality: ‘…a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic 
or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to 
the question to be decided could have arrived at it’). However, JR does not gener-
ally decide whether the decision was good or bad for those affected. The clinicians 
claimed that some clinical outcomes had been ignored and therefore the consulta-
tion on which the decision had been based was procedurally flawed. The judge, Mr 
Justice Dove, found in favour of Healthier Together CiC on 7 January 2016. His full 
judgment, based around three core arguments, outlined below, provides an insight 
into the weighing of different evidence types and the process through which the 
decision was made:
(1) All hospitals will improve and past does not indicate future performance Clini-
cians asserted that the CiC’s decision-making had ignored evidence from other 
hospitals’ past performances. Mr Justice Dove cited the ‘Decision Making Man-
agement Report’ (DMMR), which claimed ‘as current quality and safety stand-
ards will be improved in all sites [their emphasis], this should not be used as a 
criteria to determine the number of single services’ (2016, p. 122). By claiming 
that the reconfiguration would improve performance at all GM Hospitals, the 
CiC had pre-emptively downgraded the value of historic clinical data. Mr Justice 
Dove therefore rejected the assertion and was ‘satisfied that in principle it was 
rational for the defendant to put to one side existing data on clinical outcomes, 
on the basis that they are not necessarily a reliable basis for predicting clinical 
performance in the future…’ (2016: par. 108). Favouring local contemporane-
ous opinion over evidence on past performance acknowledges the complexity 
and dynamism of the system, indicating a conscious appreciation of context in 
relation to outcomes.
(2) Travel times to A&E units across GM were calculated using computer models 
that had been calibrated against real data, providing ‘simulation’ evidence. The 
plaintiff claimed that the opening of a new link road in August 2017 had not been 
incorporated into the model, rendering the simulations invalid. Again, ruling in 
favour of the defendants—and of empirical realism—the Judge noted that add-
ing ‘speculative’ (2016: par. 114) journey times into the model would have been 
inconsistent with the methodology of using actual data; ‘…an understanding 
of journey times derived from actual infrastructure on the ground, rather than 
infrastructure in the pipeline, was not irrational. It meant that the data used was 
transparent and could be checked, rather than being journey times which could 
only ever be the product of computer modelling’ (ibid.: par. 115). The claimant 
also cited ‘Hospital Episode Statistic’ data, a historic record of the relation-
ship between travel times and clinical outcomes. The defendants reiterated that 
historical data provides no basis for future predictions, as it is limited to the 
‘moment in time’ the data was extracted. Accepting the simulation evidence, 
irrespective of the new road, over historical clinical data indicates a judicial 
decision that respects, but is not in thrall to, clinical evidence.
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(3) Co-location refers to the planning of systems and pathways that cater for a range 
of conditions which rely on multiple interdependent services being available 
in the same place. Changing the availability of some services can affect other 
services outside the scope of the reconfiguration. It was claimed that the car-
diovascular, vascular, burns and Cystic Fibrosis care provided at Wythenshawe 
would be potentially harmed by the loss of emergency and high-risk surgery on 
which they were co-dependent. However, a ‘post-consultation co-dependencies 
review’ (Healthier Together 2015: appendix 45) surveyed a range of literature 
relating to each area’s dependency and, while some of this evidence came from 
other bodies engaged in reconfiguration and was at best secondary, this satis-
fied Mr Justice Dove that the consultation had been carried out correctly. It was 
concluded that: for cardiovascular and Cystic Fibrosis services, although co-
dependencies exist, co-location is not essential (Mr Justice Dove 2016: pars. 38 
and 41); that specialist sites would require ‘clear and robust pathways’ to sites 
that provided vascular surgery (par. 39); and that specialised burns treatment is 
co-dependent with general surgery, available at University Hospital of South 
Manchester (par. 40).
In short no co-dependency issue was identified as marking out a preference for 
any particular hospital to be identified as the final remaining Specialist Hospital. 
Any outstanding issues could be addressed and accommodated after the selection 
had been made and as implementation occurred (par. 46).
In (1) and (2) the judge deemed past performance clinical outcome data and computer-
modelled projection data to be not necessary for rational decision-making; and in (3) 
he validated the CiC’s reading of co-location data as rational in its aim to reach a deci-
sion. Critically, the judge was not able, nor required, to appraise the data itself; his role 
was to determine that there was a rational process at work. The key words in these 
arguments are: ‘rational’ (in the case of hospital improvement and travel times) and 
‘carried out correctly’ (in the case of co-dependencies). These are verdicts on process, 
as opposed to specific entity evidence (a clinical opinion, a balanced book, an epide-
miological prediction). The judge based his final decision upon how specific pieces of 
evidence were handled, rather than on a simple hierarchy of evidence types.
It is worth noting that several of the plaintiff’s key assertions were pre-empted or 
mitigated in the DMMR, which determined how specific pieces of evidence should be 
treated and what types of information were admissible into the decision-making pro-
cess. The judge observed that the assumptions made for the report effectively ‘cast a 
form of invisibility cloak over the question of quality and safety and has the effect of 
excluding it exerting any form of influence over the final selection of the fourth Spe-
cialist Hospital’ (Mr Justice Dove 2016, par. 109). In other words, the DMMR provided 
a sort of ‘meta-evidence’ of process, which appeared to stem in advance assertions of 
procedural impropriety.
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Treatment of evidence in judicial review vs. committees
The judge’s report, in its description, deliberation and treatment of evidence from 
both sides, and its focus on providing an independent rationale, is arguably more 
transparent than many of the documents produced by Healthier Together and the 
wider Devo Health project. Although a judge lacks expertise in the complexities of 
health service configuration, the decision being made in a judicial review is different 
in the following ways:
• JR determines if procedure, assumed to be a rational process for the treatment of 
direct evidence, has been followed—it seeks evidence of process. A committee 
deliberates on the relative merits of direct evidence. How this is done becomes the 
evidence considered in judicial review, which may lead to a different outcome.
• JR considers if the challenged decision was rational (Mr Justice Dove’s report 
contained 25 references to ir/rationality). The rationality of a committee is to 
some extent determined by its wider organisational context but also by its adher-
ence to ‘logic’ and ‘accepted moral standards’ (Lord Fraser et al. 1985). Argua-
bly, the JR in this case had to consider each of these three slightly different angles.
• The decision-making power of a group—albeit an unevenly balanced group of 
experts in different fields, subject to multiple external influences—is delegated 
into the hands of a single (theoretically more ‘objective’) expert in law and 
administrative procedure.
This change in the treatment of evidence marks a significant turning point for the 
democratic deliberation of public policy. Despite being a well-established resource, 
designed to ensure the separation of powers in modern governance, some believe JR 
is becoming too heavily relied upon. Dyson (2015, pp. 2–3) believes the ‘massive 
increase in the number of applications for judicial review’ is due to (1) the standard 
of review becoming more relaxed; (2) an ‘explosion of [rushed] legislation’, generat-
ing uncertainty and litigation; and (3) national and international challenges causing 
public bodies to take more risks. Theoretical debates around the role of JR in what 
is deemed the ‘democratic ontology’ (Lustig and Weiler 2018, p. 316) remain open. 
Recourse to a comparatively objective process can bring some order to the problems 
of complexity and evidence amalgamation that affect meso-level decisions by com-
mittee around health and social care provision. This has implications for the types of 
evidence that are sought, recorded and used by public bodies, and for the processes 
through which such decisions are made.
Nature and deliberation of evidence
To return to the original discussion of the nature of evidence—as entity, process, or 
some dual version of both—the developments in Greater Manchester suggest that it 
is best understood precisely in terms of the interaction between both in context. The 
positivist style of insistence that evidence is something known which should guide 
action, a key principle of those who argue for hierarchies of evidence with the most 
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scientific (RCTs) having the most weight, never describes how evidence is actually 
deployed in any real social context. This is probably true of many apparently clinical 
deployments but it is necessarily true of any policy formation and implementation 
process that involves the interaction, or interweaving, of complex health, social care, 
political, and urban systems within a dynamic fiscal context in which resources are 
massively constrained. In their critique of an Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR) report that purported to present evidence for hospital reconfiguration, Byrne 
and Ruane (2007) outline much the same argument, concluding that the IPPR evi-
dence failed to acknowledge major contextual factors around interdependency, the 
volume/outcome relationship and patient empowerment. The IPPR report was fur-
ther undermined by being partially sponsored by a commercial organisation.
Opinions around the best ways to organise democratic deliberation vary. Lande-
more (2017) believes in collective judgment, the need for large diverse groups, as 
objectivity can only be pursued through the mixing of equally weighted different 
perspectives, whereas Somin (2014) says that big groups are inefficient and result 
in the dilution of knowledge, and smaller groups of experts (subsidiarity) are better. 
On epistemic diversity, a distinction is made between ‘teams of experts’ (who oper-
ate independently) and ‘expert teams’ (whose combined expertise is greater than the 
set of individuals), and their relative merits in deliberating complex issues (Burke 
et al. 2004; Salas et al. 2006; Reyes and Salas 2019). This is of particular impor-
tance in integrated health and social care contexts, where problems such as ‘epis-
temic injustice’—treating people differently because of the type of knowledge they 
hold (Fricker 2007)—can emerge. This mainly philosophical concept has special 
relevance in healthcare and health policy, where it can lead to unequal power rela-
tionships between agents as sources of evidence. For example, in healthcare, where 
multiple professions with different statuses work together (increasingly as services 
become more integrated), ‘clinical knowledge’ is often prioritised over other forms 
of knowledge (Fletcher and Clarke 2020), whereas in a business context, financial 
evidence often carries more weight.
Healthier Together and Devo Health relied on deliberation among differently 
sized and differently constituted groups. Healthier Together was led by a small 
group of clinician-managers (an expert team) and organised around a public con-
sultation (then later tied to the wider politics of Devo Health), whereas Devo Health 
involved a large group from a range of public services (a team of experts). Both pro-
cesses relied on cooperation at various levels and on the deployment, weighing and 
organising of different types of entity evidence. Using a variety of heterogeneous 
evidence types to calculate the best course of action from a range of options leads 
to more robust conclusions (Fletcher et al. 2018). But external influences, political 
and financial, shape the discussion, while internal influences such as rhetoric and 
internecine competition drive that discussion in certain directions. These factors 
determine which evidence types are admitted, how they are valued relative to one 
another, and how their outcomes will be perceived more widely.
Judicial review is, theoretically, less vulnerable to the wider influences of state, 
public opinion and other threats to objectivity. Where committees amalgamate evi-
dences as separate entities, JR considers that amalgamation process itself. It is a model 
of contestation, not deliberation; an adversarial process in which two opposing parties 
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present evidence of whether due process has been followed or not. A single decision-
making agent, the judge, then determines which argument to uphold based on his or 
her own expertise in law. The judge’s report offers some transparency—setting out the 
evidence from both sides and giving a clear rationale for the decision. This legal real-
ist (as opposed to legal formalist) perspective reflects a view that those making legal 
decisions should pursue value-free approaches, and that the law does and should serve 
social ends, so legal decisions consider fairness and public policy—the real world as it 
is, rather than the more abstract world of rules (Tamanaha 2008). It has been said that 
legal realists ‘promoted the application of social science to law’ (Tamanaha 2016, p. 
147). While committees evaluate the weight and relevance of different forms of entity 
evidence according to shifting hierarchies, JR treats different forms of entity evidence 
more equally and focuses instead on how these were processed. Each approach has its 
virtues but also highlights the slippery nature of the term ‘evidence’.
Simultaneity
This article argues that the term ‘evidence’, as deployed in debates around evidence-
based policy, should be used with more caution and more nuance. Specifically, evi-
dence does not solely refer to ‘facts and data’ (which seem condemned to jockey 
for position within an artificial hierarchy determined by prevailing organisational 
and political contexts); it can also be understood as the process through which facts 
and data are put—the basis for judicial reviews. The idea that evidence might exist 
simultaneously as both entity and process makes a useful contribution to discussions 
around evidence-based policy. This simultaneity is important; a more dynamic and 
process-oriented understanding of evidence improves on the somewhat more static 
concept of categorical and hierarchical evidence ‘types’, which are ‘profoundly 
unpragmatic’ (Byrne 2011, p. 46). Just as causal mechanisms do not provide com-
plete explanations without some understanding of their context, entity evidence 
must be considered in tandem with the process it is entered into. In complex meso-
level decisions, such as those concerning health service reconfigurations or integrat-
ing health and social care services, we already recognise that context plays a vital 
role. It should not be too great a leap to consider evidence in similar terms.
Conclusion
The use of JR in health service configuration decisions mobilizes a different set of 
background understandings around evidence, in which evidence must be considered 
as both an entity and as a process determining an outcome. While the distinct dis-
ciplinary forms of facts/data-type evidence move in and out of alignment with the 
shifting priorities of different NHS structures, the JR focused solely on the logic and 
administrative process of the original committee decision. The shift from using ‘dis-
ciplinary-based’ evidence, with fluctuating values linked to a prevailing culture, to 
being an instrumental tool in the service of a ‘higher’ decision, reflects this shift in 
focus from object to process. As judicial reviews become an ever more popular way 
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to contest unpopular administrative decisions, the idea of evidence as a dynamic 
complex becomes increasingly relevant.
This more sophisticated understanding can contribute to the thinking under-
pinning health service reconfigurations and other EBP-related decisions. First, we 
might consider those deploying evidence in committee-style decision-making con-
texts as skilled builders, assembling institutional-policy life from different levels 
and forms of evidence. Accounting for the wider context, the process of admit-
ting and considering different evidence types, might enable decisions that are more 
resilient to organisational and contextual vagaries. At the very least, knowing that 
the administrative process itself might become evidence in a final decision should 
inform strategies at the committee stage. Second, for those studying related topics, 
such as knowledge aggregation, better recognising the relationship between facts 
and the process they are entered into might enable new insights in the more abstract 
debates around EBP. Either way, the core message remains: evidence terminology is 
slippery and more nuanced understandings of it would significantly benefit complex 
decision-making, especially in health and broader public policy.
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